The regime suffers none of the consequences of itsmisrule
朝鮮政權沒有受到暴政所帶來的惡果
A powerful army usually depends on a strongeconomy. Not in North Korea. Per head, the countryhas more soldiers than any other: 1.2m out of a population of 25m. As well as a hugeconventional arsenal, it also has a dozen nuclear warheads and spends perhaps $3 billion ayear on a nuclear programme that involves rocket launches and nuclear tests—the latest tookplace last week, the fourth since 2006. Yet the performance of the economy over the pastfour decades has been little sprightlier than that of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, since he wasembalmed in 1994.
North Korea suppresses most economic data. But as far as we know, from the 1950s to the1970s its economy outgrew capitalist South Korea, as a Stalinist state marshalled all resourcestowards production. Today the North's per capita GDP is only one-40th of the South's—awretched $600 a year or so, by UN estimates. The blame rests squarely with the Kim dynasty'sruinous policies. Yet the regime of Kim Jong Un, the third Kim on the throne, pays nopenalty for the people's suffering. Rather, it funnels money to itself, the elites and the nuclearprogramme.
In a recent paper for South Korea's Asan Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt of the AmericanEnterprise Institute in Washington, DC tries to estimate the scale of North Korea's economiccatastrophe. Given the paucity of data, Mr Eberstadt used “mirror statistics”: estimates of thecountry's trade divined from other countries' records. He then made adjustments forpopulation growth and inflation. It is no straight proxy for output, but useful nonetheless.
來自華盛頓特區美國企業研究所(the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC)的尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特(Nicholas Eberstadt)在其最近為韓國峨山研究院(South Korea's Asan Institute)撰寫的一篇報告中試圖估計出北朝鮮的經濟災難的規模。由于缺乏數據,他使用“鏡像統計數據”:也就是用與他國的貿易記錄來估計朝鮮的貿易量。然后他再根據國家的人口和通脹情況對估計出來的數據做出調整。得出的結果雖然不是朝鮮產出的直接指標,但是卻是有用的。
Mr Eberstadt found that North Korea's per-capita exports last year were no higher than at theirpeak in the late 1970s, while per-capita imports were two-fifths lower. North Korea's economicunderperformance is remarkable for a country that is neither a failed state nor at war, he says.
What went wrong? The collapse of the Soviet Union, upon which the North had long relied forcheap machinery and oil, certainly hit it hard in the 1990s. Weakened by bad weather, centrallyrun agricultural production collapsed in the 1990s, leading to a famine in which hundreds ofthousands of people died. International sanctions in response to North Korea's nuclear bomb-testing have also hurt.
But the biggest problem, Mr Eberstadt argues, is that North Korea has the worst businessenvironment of any functioning state: worse even than Cuba, Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It hasno property rights or rule of law, no legal private trade and a currency prone to confiscation:in 2009 the government wiped out small traders' savings by declaring old banknotes invalid andswapping only a few for new ones.
A striking feature of the North's economic decline is the quantities of foreign aid thataccompanied it. North Korea has a long history of shaking down donors—first the Soviet Union,then, after 1991, America and South Korea, and most recently China. The total amount oftransfers is impossible to quantify. But Mr Eberstadt estimates the sum from the North's twobiggest historical backers, Russia and China, by taking its balance of trade deficits with each ofthem as an approximation of net resource flows into the North—assuming that the surplus isa debt that will not be repaid. That surplus amounts to $45 billion, in today's money, between1960 and 2013.
The money seems to have helped the Kims live like god-kings and still have enough left over topay the army, the secret police and various suppliers of nuclear materials. Yet Rüdiger Frank, aneconomist at the University of Vienna, thinks that increased supplies of hard currency may alsohave helped the informal markets for food and basic supplies that burgeoned as a responseto the famine. These black markets are the single most benign transformation in NorthKorea in the past few years. Most North Koreans now depend on them for their livelihoods. Thestate usually turns a blind eye, since its central planning system, which is supposed toapportion goods, has broken down. Besides, the elites demand their cut.
Some see in such markets the seeds of deeper economic reform. And Mr Kim seems keenerthan his father to promise prosperity to his people, and even a modicum of leisure. NorthKorea's capital, Pyongyang, now boasts a dolphinarium and a water park, and even a ski resortto its east. As high rises go up, the capital's fashionable sip espressos in upmarket bars.
Yet the regime's old habits are unchanged. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the state issqueezing the donju, North Korea's new successful class of traders. According to DailyNK, anews source with informants in the North, donju are worried that they will be forced to handover hard-currency savings to make up for the “massive dollar bomb”—ie, the expensivenuclear test—that was detonated last week.
In the absence of direction from the top, there are limits to how much can change. A new policythat seems to have been quietly rolled out from 2013 allowed farmers to retain 30% of a newproduction target, plus any excess over the target, to sell on informal markets. Yet localofficials are not distributing the promised shares, perhaps to make up a shortfall atcooperatives, according to a report by Radio Free Asia.
Meanwhile, the few foreign investors brave enough to enter North Korea must contend with anunpredictable and predatory state. In November the biggest such, Orascom, an Egyptiantelecoms company that set up the North's first 3G mobile net- work, said that it thought it hadlost control of its joint venture, and has not been able to repatriate its profits.
China remains North Korea's lifeline. Most products for sale in the North's informal markets arefrom China. Last year North Korea sold over $1 billion of minerals to China, chiefly coal. AsChina's economy slows and the price of coal falls, the North will suffer. But the regime has asolution: putting its scant resources into military power. This serves as a “battering-ram forinternational extortion”, as Mr Eberstadt puts it. Alas, it seems to work.