The outbreak of the first world war was, we are told,greeted with confidence and jubilation by thepeoples of Europe. Something similar seems to behappening after years of economic crisis and politicalturmoil in Greece. A growing number of people feelthat enough is now enough. The strident viewsexpressed in these pages by the Italian economist,Francesco Giavazzi, **are shared by many in highoffice. Meanwhile, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek primeminister, accuses Greece’s creditors of “pillaging” hiscountry.
Olivier Blanchard, the International Monetary Fund’s sober chief economist, indicates that a dealmight still be reached. But many are beginning to long to see the knot cut. Whatever game theGreeks thought they were playing, their government may now just desire an end to thehumiliation. Similarly, whatever game the eurogroup may have been playing, it may now justwant an end to the frustration. If so, Greek default, exit and devaluation could be fairly close.
Would euphoria then last? I fear not. The assumption of some in the eurozone is not onlythat the Greek case is unique, but that the disaster those sinners so deserve would improvethe behaviour of everybody else. But the currency union would also no longer be irrevocable.New crises will occur. When they do, confidence in the union would be less than complete aftera Greek exit. The programme of Outright Monetary Transactions, announced by the EuropeanCentral Bank in 2012, might need to be implemented, to calm nerves. But it could fail. Self-fulfilling speculation could force even more divorces.
Some argue that Greece at least would be far better off after a default and exit. It is indeedtheoretically possible that a default to its public creditors, combined with introduction of a newcurrency, a big devaluation (accompanied by sound monetary and fiscal policies),maintenance of an open economy, structural reforms and institutional improvements wouldmark a turn for the better. Far more likely is a period of chaos and, at worst, emergence of afailed state. A Greece that could manage exit well would have also avoided today’s plight.
Neither side should underestimate the risks. It is also crucial to avoid the contempt socharacteristic of the frayed nerves caused by failing negotiations.
雙方都不應低估風險。同樣關鍵的是,要避免談判失敗往往導致的蔑視情緒。
Fecklessness may be a grievous fault, but grievously have the Greeks answered it. As the Irisheconomist, Karl Whelan, points out in a blistering response to Mr Giavazzi, the Greek economyhas suffered a staggering collapse. From peak to trough, aggregate real gross domesticproduct fell by 27 per cent, while real spending in the economy fell by a third. The cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance improved by 20 per cent of GDP between 2009 and 2014 and thecurrent account balance improved by 16 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 2014.?? Theunemployment rate reached 28 per cent in 2013, while government employment fell by 30 percent between 2009 and 2014. Such a brutal adjustment would have shredded the politics ofany country. (See charts.)
Europeans are now dealing with Syriza because of this calamity. But they are also dealingwith Syriza because of the refusal to write down more of the debt in 2010. This was a hugeerror, made far worse by the subsequent collapse of the Greek economy. Indeed, the vastbulk of the official loans to Greece were not made for its benefit at all, but for that of itsfeckless private creditors. Creditors, too, have a duty to take care. If they are careless, theyrisk big losses. If governments want to save them, their own taxpayers should be told to payup.
Greece has also already made significant reforms, including to its pension arrangements andbusiness environment. But backtracking on such reforms would indeed be a huge mistake, asthe eurogroup and IMF argue.
Given all this, it is tragic that the breakdown might occur now, after so much pain has alreadybeen suffered. It is not too late to reach agreements aimed at promoting reform, minimisingadditional austerity and making debt manageable. That would also be in everybody’s long-term interest. The parameters of such a deal are also clear: a small primary surplus in theshort run, a decision by the eurozone to pay off the IMF and the ECB, accompanied by long-term debt relief, and a strong commitment to bold structural reforms by the Greekgovernment.
Whether it likes it or not (understandably, it does not) the European Central Bank is a centralplayer. It will have to decide when it can no longer treat the credit of the Greek government ascollateral against emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks. If Greece cannot reach adeal on the release of funds, the ECB seems likely to cut the banks off. That would thentrigger controls on withdrawals. This might be accompanied by a scheme for circulation ofdeposit receipts, or ultimately by messy introduction of a new currency.
Right now, however, the aim must still be to cool down and secure a deal. Yet, in the currentmood of anger and recrimination, reaching one now seems ever more unlikely. That would notbe the end of the story, however. Europeans will be unable to walk away. Whether Greece staysinside the euro or leaves, much the same challenges will arise. The Europeans would still have toadmit that they would not get much of their money back; and they would still have to helpavoid a Greek collapse.
It might be a relief to divorce a difficult partner. But the partner will still exist, even after thismonetary marriage is over. Greece will remain strategically located and even inside the EU.Neither the Greeks nor their partners should imagine a clean break. The relationship willcontinue. It will just be poisonous. If, tragically, that fate cannot be avoided, it will have to bemanaged for a very long time.